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ARTICLE

Why do Firms Manage their
Earnings?
Zeeshan Ahmed

T

he topic of corporate earnings management has not only generated a great deal
of media attention but it also has become a source of serious concern to regulators
and policymakers. In the wake of the events that shook investors’ confidence in the
American financial reporting system in late 2001 and early 2002, the earnings
management practices of firms have come under fire by shareholders groups, institutional
investors and the financial press alike. To some extent, regulators have responded by
proposing and enacting new rules and regulations1. Likewise, accounting and financial
researchers are increasingly probing into this topic.
Prior studies identify several such incentives, which can be broadly classified as:
capital market incentives, contracting incentives, and regulation-related incentives.
This article covers a brief explanation of the sources and nature of these incentives
along with summary of related research findings. But before we begin on incentives,
we briefly present definition and nature of earnings management.
Definition of Earnings Management
Below are some of the widely quoted definitions of earnings management found in
the literature:
“… a purposeful intervention in the external reporting process, with the intent of
obtaining some private gain (as opposed to, say, merely facilitating the neutral operation
of the process).”… “A minor extension of this definition would encompass “real”
earnings management, accomplished by timing investment or financing decisions to
alter reported earnings or some subset of it.” (Schipper, K., 1989)
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting
and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” (Healy and
Whalen, 1999)
Although earnings management is generally considered to occur within the framework
of financial reporting, the first definition also accommodates earnings management
through “real activities” such as timing asset sales, delaying maintenance, altering
1

For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which President George W. Bush
dubbed as “the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since the
time of Franklin D. Roosevelt”.
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R&D expenditure. While earnings can be managed through real activities, it is usually
relatively more costly and less convenient for managers to do that. Also, it is
methodologically difficult for the researchers to spot such manipulation. Researchers
do not have a reliable mechanism to distinguish the real decisions undertaken to modify
reported earnings from the ones undertaken solely for rational value maximization.
For instance, if a firm sells assets near the end of an accounting year, it is difficult for
the researcher to ascertain or demonstrate whether the primary motivation behind such
a sale is to achieve an earnings target or operational efficiency. Therefore, most of the
research in this area focuses on earnings management through pure accrual manipulation.
In order to understand the true nature of earnings management, one needs to first
appreciate the fine line between ‘earnings management’ and the legitimate application
of accrual accounting.
Earnings Management and Accrual Accounting
The primary objective of accrual accounting is to provide a better and more meaningful
measure of a firm’s current economic income and to be a better predictor of the firm’s
future performance than is available by examining cash flows. The idea is that the
earnings number should be reflective of the economic substance underlying financial
transactions rather than merely representing the cash receipts and payments for the
period. But the analysis shows that the accrual process inherently produces a consistently
smoother income number than cash flows. Expressed differently, earnings smoothing
is an inherent property of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) based
accrual accounting. Therefore, in practice, it is quite difficult to separate income
smoothing arising from the implementation of GAAP based accrual accounting and
that resulting from management of earnings. The definitions given above rely on
managerial intent (as manifested in the words “with the intent of obtaining private
gain…” or “…mislead…or to influence contractual outcomes…”) to distinguish
earnings management from faithful implementation of accrual accounting.
Both the definitions quoted above correspond to the opportunistic perspective of
earnings management. The accounting literature takes two perspectives on earnings
management: (1) an information perspective and (2) an opportunistic perspective.
Under the opportunistic perspective, which has its roots in agency theory (see Jensen
and Meckling, 1976), managers are assumed to manipulate earnings to mislead
stakeholders or to maximize their (managers’) personal benefit at the cost of other
stakeholders’ interests. “Information perspective”, on the other hand, regards earnings
management as a mechanism through which managers attempt to reveal their private
information about future prospects of the company to the investors (see Holthausen
and Leftwich, 1983). Most prior research in this area is based on the opportunistic
perspective.
Earnings Management versus Fraudulent Reporting
While not all attempts to manage earnings are outright fraud, many accounting
irregularities that are later classified as fraudulent reporting by the SEC emanate from
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seemingly naïve efforts of the firm to smooth income by engaging in earnings
management. The National Association of Certified Fraud Examiners defines financial
fraud as: “the intentional, deliberate, misstatement or omission of material facts, or
accounting data, which is misleading and, when considered with all the information
made available, would cause the reader to change or alter his or her judgment or
decision.” Academics and regulators seem to agree on the notion that while earnings
management can be exercised within the limits of GAAP accounting, fraudulent
reporting necessarily entails overt violation of GAAP2.
Capital Market Incentives
Although earlier earnings management research focused heavily on contracting and
regulatory incentives ignoring the capital market motivations for managing earnings,
recent studies have found capital market incentives to be a strong driving force behind
managers’ attempts to manage earnings. Dechow and Skinner (2000) argue that
“academic research should focus more on capital market incentives for earnings
management”. The growing importance of capital market incentives in earnings
management is directly related to the increasing sensitivity of managers to stock price
movements.
Reported earnings are an important input for valuation decisions by investors, analysts,
and other market participants. The fixation of market participants on earnings figures
creates incentives for the managers to manipulate them in the direction which best
serves their own interests. Several studies investigate whether or not firms manage
earnings around various capital market transactions. These studies begin with analyzing
managerial incentives to manage earnings in the context of such transactions. The
analysis yields hypotheses about the direction of earnings management (incomeincreasing versus income-decreasing). Finally, parametric and/or non-parametric
techniques are used to test the hypothesis about the presence, direction and extent of
earnings management. The following paragraphs review selected studies falling in the
aforementioned category.
DeAngelo (1988) and Perry and Williams (1994) analyze management buyouts and
argue that in the presence of information asymmetries, managers acting in their own
interest rather than in the interest of the shareholders would attempt to get a bargain
price for the buyout. Accruals manipulation affords a convenient method for managers
to understate earnings and thus the stock price. Although DeAngelo (1988) fails to
find evidence in favor of her hypothesis, Perry and Williams (1994) document
significantly negative discretionary accruals prior to a buyout.
2

Examples of fraudulent earnings management include recording fictitious sales, and
related receivables, deferring expenses that should be recognized in current period.
A specific example would be WorldCom’s misclassification of a staggering $3.8 billion
of operating expenses as capital expenditures.
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Likewise, Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998 a and b) make a case for income-increasing
earnings management prior to initial public offers (IPO’s) and seasoned equity issues
(SEOs). By engaging in income-increasing earnings management prior to these equity
issues, managers can paint a favorable picture of a firm’s prospects, thereby obtaining
an attractive price for the newly issued stocks. They find that equity issuing firms
typically have higher earnings prior to stock issues most of which is attributable to
high discretionary current accruals. They also show that the post-issue underperformance
is strongly predicted by the extent of upward earnings management at the time of
issue. Further, the evidence indicated reversal of abnormal accruals in years subsequent
to the equity issue. Rangan (1998) and Shivakumar (2000) provide similar evidence
using quarterly data. Shivakumar (2000) uses a rational expectations explanation to
account for earnings management and subsequent investor reaction. He contends that
investors recognize and undo earnings management at the time of the announcement.
Similar incentives exist in cases of stock-for-stock mergers. The acquiring firm in
such transactions has inducements to inflate the stock price around the agreement date,
so that the purchase can be made by issuing fewer stocks. Therefore, it is in the interest
of an acquiring firm to resort to income-increasing earnings management in periods
before the merger agreement. Erickson and Wang (1999) show that not only are the
discretionary accruals significantly positive prior to mergers, but their size has a
significant relationship with the size of the merger. Louis (2004) shows evidence of
acquiring firms using income-increasing current accruals in the quarter preceding a
stock swap announcement. He relates post-merger underperformance of acquiring
firms to the reversal of pre-merger earnings overstatement.
Beneish (1999), studying a sample of firms subject to SEC accounting enforcement
actions, documents that managers are likely to sell their shareholdings and exercise
stock appreciation rights when the earnings are overstated and share prices are inflated.
Park and Park (2004) find that managers engage in income-increasing earnings
management prior to the sale of shares by insiders. The degree of discretionary accruals
prior to the sale was also found to have predictive power for stock underperformance
after the insider sales.
Vafeas, Vlittis, Katranis, and Ockree (2003) find some evidence of relatively low
discretionary accruals prior to self-tender offers. However, Chou and Lin (2003)
observe that managers resort to inflating the stock price through the upward management
of discretionary accruals around the share repurchase announcements. The authors
argue that managers, through income increasing earnings management, attempt to
enhance the credibility of the undervaluation signal sent to the market by the repurchase
announcement.
Bartov and Mohanram (2004) document that managers overstate earnings before
abnormally large stock option exercises in order to increase their payout. The postexercise underperformance of the stock of such firms is reflective of the subsequent
reversal of overstated earnings. Anthony, Bettinghaus, and Farber (2004) show that
firms appear to increase discretionary current accruals around convertible debt offerings,
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but fail to relate the discretionary accruals to the subsequent long-term underperformance
of such issues.
Apart from the incentives spawned by the specific capital market transactions discussed
above, strong incentives to manage earnings also arise in response to capital market
pressures for meeting simple earnings benchmarks. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997)
scrutinize the cross-sectional frequency distribution of earnings and changes in earnings
and notice that the probability associated with observing small losses and small declines
in earnings is lower than expected. Conversely, the incidences of small profits and
small increases in earnings from the previous year are unusually high. In the absence
of any purposeful managerial intervention in the financial reporting process, such
statistical anomalies are highly unlikely. Therefore, the authors explain these distributional
inconsistencies as arising from managerial motivation to avoid losses and earnings
declines.
Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999) present a hierarchy of benchmarks for quarterly
earnings that managers attempt to achieve. Once firms have avoided losses and earnings
declines, meeting analysts’ forecasts becomes the next critical target. He provides
evidence similar to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) regarding distributional discontinuities
around analysts’ earnings expectations. Brown (1999) finds that over time the disruption
in frequency distribution around these benchmarks has become even more pronounced.
Kasznik (1999) shows that managers use discretionary accruals to increase income
in cases where earnings are likely to fall short of management’s forecast, and revise
the forecast upward when earnings exceed their earlier forecast.
Myers and Skinner (1999), using a time-series approach, provide evidence that the
firms manage earnings to show consistent earnings growth. In their sample, the number
of firms reporting a continuous increase in earnings is unusually high. Further, they
show that firms use special items and income tax provision for income smoothing.
Contracting Incentives
Early research in earnings management focused on managerial motivations to manage
earnings arising from firms’ contracts with other stakeholders. Typically, terms of such
contracts incorporated earnings figures as a key to certain payoffs to the parties involved
(e.g., management bonuses) or as a mechanism for monitoring the compliance with
contract terms (e.g., lending contracts). Managers enjoy a unique position in these
contracts as they are, on one hand, a party to the contract (being affected by the outcome
of earnings), and, on the other hand, perched at a vantage point to influence contractual
outcomes by managing reported earnings. Under agency theory arguments, managers
are expected to influence the earnings in a manner that would best serve their selfinterest. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) identified managerial incentives to affect
accounting choices in the context of bonus schemes, lending agreements, and taxes,
as well as political costs. Below, we discuss major research works on earnings
management related to two important contracts: earnings-based management
compensation contracts and lending contracts.
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Compensation Contracts:
Most companies tie managerial bonus awards to the reported earnings. Watts and
Zimmerman (1986), using agency theory arguments, postulate that managers, acting
to maximize the present value of their wealth, would attempt to choose those accounting
procedures that would shift the reported earnings to the present period. Zmijewski and
Hagerman (1981), in one of the earliest papers in this area, reported a significant
association between management incentive contracts and income strategy (firm’s
accounting choices to arrive at income). Healy (1985), in a seminal work in ‘bonus
plan’ research, documented a strong association between accruals and earnings-related
incentives under bonus plans3. Healy (1985) treated the mean total accruals in the
estimation period as a measure of non-discretionary accruals. Thus, discretionary
accruals were defined as deviation from this mean. Specifically, the study found that
managers tend to manage accruals downward when upper or lower bounds of their
bonus plans are binding and upward when these limits are not binding. They also
found evidence that adjustments in accounting methods are associated with modifications
in the bonus schemes.
Gaver, Gaver and Austin (1995) extended Healy’s work by using the Jones (1991)
model and detailed proprietary dataset to gauge the behavior of discretionary accruals
with respect to bonus schemes. Unlike Healy, they found that firms engage in incomeincreasing earnings manipulation when un-managed earnings fall short of the lower
bound. Likewise, Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995) confirmed Healy’s findings
of downward earnings management when the executive bonuses peak, but failed to
find evidence for downward earnings management when earnings are below the lower
bound. Guidry, Leone and Rock (1999) improved the methodology in this line of
research by using business unit data rather than corporate level data. Consistent with
Healy (1985), they find that business unit level managers for large conglomerate
multinational firms are likely to resort to income decreasing accruals when the earnings
target in their bonus plans will not be met and when they are entitled to the maximum
bonuses allowed under the plans. Richardson and Waegelein (2002) showed that the
firms having long-term performance plans engage in earnings management to a lesser
extent than firms that have only short-term bonus plans.
Aside from bonus schemes, earnings management has also been linked to top executives’
job security and other implicit incentives. DeAngelo (1988) shows evidence of incomeincreasing earnings management during proxy fights (a potential threat to managers’
job security). Dempsey (1993) documents an inverse relationship between earnings
management and managerial ownership. He attributed non-owner managers’ job
insecurity as a possible reason for this result. Gao and Shrieves (2002) relate the degree
of earnings management to the design of compensation contracts. They show that
earnings management is likely to be relatively more intense for firms having
3

Healy (1985) treated the mean total accruals in the estimation period as a measure of
non-discretionary accruals. Thus, discretionary accruals were defined as deviation from
this mean.

50

Published by iRepository, February 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/businessreview/vol1/iss1/6
DOI: https://doi.org/10.54784/1990-6587.1094

Business Review - Volume 1 Number 1

July - December 2006

higher degrees of stock options or bonuses and lower proportions of salaries in the
pay structure. Some evidence related to stock options is covered in the section on
capital market incentives.
Lending Contracts:
Debt contracts generally include accounting-based covenants for the protection of the
lenders. Typically, these covenants require firms to maintain certain financial ratios
(like leverage, working capital, fixed charge coverage, and related ratios), and impose
restrictions on dividends as well as on borrowings. For those firms that are approaching
the violation of accounting-based covenants, a tempting alternative to contravening
the contract terms is to engage in income-increasing earnings management. Arguing
along these lines, several accounting researchers investigated the earnings management
behavior of firms facing covenant violation. For example, Press and Weintrop (1990)
investigated the effects of accounting constraints of debt agreements on a firm’s
accounting choices. They show that accounting choices are significantly affected by
both leverage and a leverage constraint indicator (a measure of the closeness to violating
a leverage ratio covenant). More specifically, they find that firms resort to income
increasing strategies in the presence of leverage constraints. Bartov (1993) documents
a significantly positive relationship between the gains from asset sales and a firm’s
debt-to-equity ratio (which is a researcher’s proxy for closeness to a covenant violation).
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) provided evidence that the firms that eventually endup violating covenants resort to income-increasing earnings management in the year
preceding the violation. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1994) scrutinized the
accounting choices of troubled firms (i.e., those firms with persistent losses and
dividend reductions). They reported that such firms had significant income-decreasing
accruals in the dividend-reduction-year and in the following three years, a time period
during which these firms engaged in contract renegotiations with lenders, unions, and
the government. Similarly, Sweeney (1994) finds evidence for income increasing
accounting changes for firms approaching default. Furthermore, the covenant violators
also managed earnings after the technical default, possibly to avoid future violations.
Thus the overall evidence on earnings management in the context of ‘compensation’
and ‘lending contracts’ suggests that these contracts induce managers to manipulate
earnings to increase bonus remuneration and job-security and decrease the likelihood
of technical default.
Regulatory Motivations
Another potential source of earnings management incentives arises from government
regulations. These incentives are more pronounced in cases where industries face
heavier regulatory burden. Typically, regulators monitor certain accounting figures to
ensure firms’ compliance with industry-specific and anti-trust regulations, which in
turn, motivates managers to manipulate accruals in the desired direction. These
incentives are strong, especially when the firms are on the verge of violating the
regulation. For instance, banks must comply with capital adequacy requirements. If
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they fail to do so, they risk regulatory intervention in the form of restrictions on
dividends, mandatory asset reduction, and ultimately, management dismissal. Therefore,
banks that are near the minimum required capital are found to manage earnings upward
to ward-off regulatory crackdown. Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson (1990) find evidence
of earnings management from income from investment security transactions. Moyer
(1990) shows that banks manage loan loss reserves and securities gains to manipulate
earnings. Clinch and Magliolo (1993) show that bank managers use income from
discretionary transactions (like miscellaneous gains and losses) to manage earnings.
Collins, Shackelford and Wahlen (1995) find that loan write-offs, security issuances,
and dividend payments are used to manage capital and loan loss reserves to manage
earnings. Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995) find that loan loss reserves, loanwrite offs, and security issue decisions are jointly determined to manage primary
capital ratios.
Apart from industry-specific regulations, incentives to manage earnings also stem
from a host of other regulations. Specifically, firms facing adverse political consequences
like anti-trust or anti-dumping investigations, have incentives to appear less profitable
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Similarly, firms seeking government subsidies or
protection from foreign competition may attempt to win government sympathy by
appearing to be financially weak. Jones (1991) documents that the firms undergoing
import relief investigation by the U.S. International Trade Commission engage in
income-decreasing earnings management so that they can obtain a favorable verdicts.
Likewise, Cahan (1992) documents that firms that are under investigation for antitrust
violations by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission manage
earnings downward during the investigation period. Cahan, Chavis, and Elemendorf
(1997) show that at the time when Congress was debating a proposal to impose
environmental clean-up costs on the chemical industry, the firms in that industry
exhibited income decreasing accruals. Key (1997) shows similar behavior on the part
of cable television companies during Congressional investigations regarding industry
deregulation. Han and Wang (1998) show that petroleum refining firms managed
earnings downward around Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait to hide excessive profits resulting
from a steep surge in oil prices in order to avoid possible regulatory actions against
them.
Big Bath Accounting
One earnings management approach that deserves special mention when investigating
firms’ reporting behavior around adverse announcements (like product recall) is ‘big
bath’ accounting. Under this approach, firms going through a particularly ‘bad’ year
or quarter overstate their losses in an attempt to clean up their balance sheets and
create a buffer which can be used to artificially inflate the earnings in future periods.
Big bath accounting is manifested in sizeable asset write-offs as well as in income
decreasing discretionary accruals.
Big bath behavior is encouraged by Wall Street’s tendency to overlook large writeoffs as one-time events and focus on future earnings. Firms can afford to overstate
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their losses (i.e., take a big bath) because of the fact that investor reaction to adverse
earnings news does not exacerbate proportionally to its intensity. Stated differently,
the market reaction to an earnings announcement for a 15% shortfall in earnings may
be only slightly more negative than the reaction to a 10% shortfall. Therefore, when
the firms find that their earnings are far too short of market expectations so that even
the plausible manipulation of discretionary items would not help them achieve the
target, they might resort to taking a big bath instead. Remaining paragraphs in this
section present a brief summary of prior findings on big bath accounting.
A typical context in which the big bath hypothesis has been most frequently explored
is management changes. Moore (1973) investigated the prevalence of discretionary
accounting decisions subsequent to management changes. He found the incidences of
income decreasing accounting choices to be significantly higher in firms with
management changes relative to firms with no management change. In a similar vein,
Pourciau (1993) investigated firms’ earnings management practices around non-routine
executive changes. He found that incoming executives manage earnings downward
and take large write-offs in the year of change and manage earnings upward in the
subsequent year. Collins and DeAngelo (1990) provide similar evidence of income
decreasing earnings management subsequent to management changes as a result of
proxy contests.
Healy’s (1985) work regarding bonus payments also lends support to the big bath
hypothesis. Langer and Lev (1993) found that firms are likely to take large asset writeoffs when earnings fall below the lower bound for bonus calculations. Abarbanell and
Lehavy (2002) demonstrate that firms that receive unfavorable ratings (i.e., “Sell”
recommendations) from analysts have weak incentives to meet earnings expectations.
Consequently, these firms resort to taking a ‘big bath’ during such periods and they
create hidden reserves that enable them to manage earnings upward in the future. This
is evidenced by the presence of frequent and extreme negative discretionary accruals
for such firms in those periods. On the other hand, firms that receive favorable analyst
ratings (i.e., “Buy” recommendations), tend to engage in income-increasing earnings
management to meet the analysts’ expectations on a more frequent basis. Elliot and
Shaw (1988) and Strong and Meyer (1987) provide evidence for association between
large write-offs and firms’ underperformance.
Overall, the empirical evidence is consistent with the theoretical framework developed
by Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2002) where they show that both smoothing and big
bath can coexist. They show that “for sufficiently “bad” news, the manager underreports earnings by the maximum, preferring to take a “big bath” in the current period
in order to report higher future earnings. If the news is “good,” the manager smoothes
earnings, with the amount of smoothing depending on the level of cash flows observed.
He either over-reports or partially under-reports for slightly good news, and gradually
increases his under-reporting as the news gets better, until he is under-reporting the
maximum amount for sufficiently good news. This result holds both when investors
are “naïve” and ignore management’s ability to manipulate earnings, and when they
are “sophisticated” and correctly infer management's disclosure strategy.”
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TWELVE QUESTIONS FOR EXAMINING THE ETHICS OF A BUSINESS
DECISION
1. Have you defined the problem accurately?
2. How would you define the problem if you stood on the other side of the fence?
3. How did this situation occur in the first place?
4. To whom and to what do you give your loyalty as a person and as a member
of the corporation?
5. What is your intention in making this decision?
6. How does this intention compare with the probable results?
7. Whom could your decision or action injure?
8. Can you discuss the problem with the affected parties before you make your
decision?
9. Are you confident that your position will be as valid over a long period of time
as it seems now?
10. Could you disclose without qualm your decision or action to your boss, your
CEO, the board of directors, your family, society as a whole?
11. What is the symbolic potential of your action if understood? If misunderstood?
12. Under what conditions would you allow exceptions to your stand?
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